FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to measuring devices and specifically to the certification of a measurement re sult of a measuring device.

STATE OF THE ART

With accelerating digitalization and automati zation the need for new solutions to improve reliable and wide access to digital measurement data is great. At present the calibration certificates of measuring devices are either paper documents or PDF (portable doc ument format) documents which are electronic, but in content equivalent to the paper documents, and which are not machine-understandable. Essentially the only bene fit they provide to the user of the measuring device is documenting the verification of the accuracy of the measuring device relative to a national measurement standard. The added value provided by the existing an alogue certificates has up to the present been almost exclusively that of quality control.

Currently there is no digital calibration cer tificate in which strong and secure authentication would be combined in a way proving that the calibration in formation belongs with certainty to a specific measuring device .

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

According to a first aspect of the present in vention, a data security module is disclosed. The data security module comprises a key storage which is con figured to store a cryptographic key in a protected manner, such that said cryptographic key is usable in- ternally in the data security module without being ac cessible from outside of the data security module. The data security module further comprises a signing func tion which is configured to perform digital signing us ing the cryptographic key stored in the key storage. The data security module further comprises a certificate storage which is configured to store at least a part of a digital calibration certificate associated with a measuring device associated with the data security mod ule, such that the at least part of the digital cali bration certificate is accessible from outside of the data security module. The cryptographic key stored in the key storage is a secret key of a public key cryp tography key pair associated with the measuring device, and the at least part of the digital calibration cer tificate stored in the certificate storage is associated with a public key corresponding to the secret key.

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module further comprises a physically unclon- able function (PUF) for generating the secret key during runtime .

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module further comprises a real-time clock.

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module further comprises a communication func tion for external communication of the data security module .

In an embodiment of the invention, the protec tion of the key storage is implemented on a hardware level .

In an embodiment of the invention, the signing function is implemented at least partly on a hardware level .

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least part of the digital calibration certificate stored in the certificate storage comprises the public key. In an embodiment of the invention, the at least part of the digital calibration certificate stored in the certificate storage comprises identity information associated with the public key.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, a measuring device arranged in connection with the data security module according to the first aspect of the invention is disclosed. The measuring de vice comprises a measuring instrument, at least one pro cessor, and at least one memory which comprises computer program code. The at least one memory and the computer program code are configured with the at least one pro cessor to cause the measuring device to:

take under processing a measurement result pro duced using the measuring instrument;

associate a digital calibration certificate associated with a public key corresponding to a secret key stored in a key storage of the data security module with the measurement result taken under processing; and digitally sign the associated measurement re sult using a signing function of the data security mod ule and the secret key stored in the key storage.

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured with the at least one processor to cause the measuring device to perform the association of the dig ital calibration certificate with the measurement result taken under processing by generating a hash of the dig ital calibration certificate and by including the gen erated hash in the measurement result taken under pro cessing .

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured with the at least one processor to cause the measuring device to generate a hash of the signed meas urement result and store the generated hash in a block- chain . In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module comprises a real-time clock and the at least one memory and the computer program code are fur ther configured with the at least one processor to cause the measuring device to generate a timestamp for the signed measurement result using the real-time clock.

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured with the at least one processor to cause the measuring device to generate a timestamp for the signed measurement result using elDAS (Electronic Identifica tion, Authentication and Trust Services) .

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory and the computer program code are further configured with the at least one processor to cause the measuring device to protect communication with an ex ternal third party.

According to a third aspect of the present in vention, a method of certification of a measurement re sult of a measuring device is disclosed. The method comprises the steps of:

taking under processing, by the measuring de vice, a measurement result produced using the measuring device ;

associating, by the measuring device, a digital calibration certificate with the measurement result taken under processing, the digital calibration certif icate associated with a public key corresponding to a secret key stored in a key storage of the data security module according to the first aspect of the invention configured in connection with the measuring device; and digitally signing, by the measuring device, the associated measurement result using a signing function of the data security module and the secret key stored in the key storage.

In an embodiment of the invention, the associ ation of the digital calibration certificate with the measurement result taken under processing is performed by generating a hash of the digital calibration certif icate and by including the generated hash in the meas urement result taken under processing.

In an embodiment of the invention, the method further comprises generating, by the measuring device, a hash of the signed measurement result and storing, by the measuring device, the generated hash in a block- chain .

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module comprises a real-time clock and the method further comprises generating, by the measuring device, a timestamp for the signed measurement result using the real-time clock.

In an embodiment of the invention, the method further comprises generating, by the measuring device, a timestamp for the signed measurement result using el- DAS (Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services) .

According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer program product is disclosed, which computer program product comprises at least one computer-readable storage medium which comprises a set of instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause a measuring device to perform the method according to the third aspect of the invention.

With the solution according to the invention the manufacturers of devices producing measurement re sults may easily and cost-efficiently attach to their products a functionality by means of which the devices automatically sign the produced measurement results us ing a digital calibration certificate defined for the device during or after manufacture as a certificate of signing of the measurement results. At least some of the solutions according to the invention enable the signing of measurement results to be performed in a way enabling the measurement results to be offered for purchasing by other organizations in a data market.

Replacing conventional calibration certifi cates with digital calibration certificates provides the advantage of improving the quality and reusability of measurement data, as digital certificates enable the accuracy, measurement conditions and authenticity of the data to be certified. Because it has so far been prob lematic to certify the Internet of Things (IoT) based IOT data, and because there is no clear solution for it, the use of digital calibration certificates as the cer tificates also significantly improves the quality of data of IoT systems processing measurement data and the reliability of the results obtained.

At least some of the solutions according to the invention are useful e.g. for measuring device and IoT device manufacturers, because they enable the device manufacturers to quickly and easily implement new stand ards and because they enable the implementation of nec essary technology already before completion of the standard, such that devices existing in the market al ready may easily be updated according to the standard. Further, at least some of the solutions according to the invention are useful for device owners, because by means of the solutions the device owners may quickly and eas ily introduce the data produced by the device into a data market.

LIST OF FIGURES

Below the invention will be described by means of the following examples of its embodiments with ref erence to the accompanying drawing, in which

Fig. 1 is a schematic illustration of a system according to the invention;

Fig. 2A is a block diagram of a data security module according to the invention; Fig. 2B is a block diagram of a measuring de vice according to the invention;

Fig. 2C is a block diagram of another measuring device according to the invention;

Fig. 3A is a flow diagram of a method according to the invention; and

Fig. 3B is a flow diagram of another method according to the invention.

The same reference numbers are used throughout the accompanying drawing to refer to the corresponding elements .

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Below is a detailed description of embodiments of the present invention, examples of which are illus trated in the accompanying drawings. The following de tailed description together with the accompanying draw ing are intended to illustrate the examples, and are not intended to represent the only forms in which the pre sented examples may be implemented or utilized. In the following, example functions and sequences of steps/op erations for combining and using the examples will be disclosed. However, the same or equivalent functions and steps/operations may also be accomplished with other examples .

The advantage of digital calibration certifi cates is their machine-processability. This enables the utilization of the information contained by the certif icates in other automatized systems. In addition, by means of digital calibration certificates the measure ment data produced by measuring devices can be better protected by using the calibration certificate as a cer tificate of the digital signatures used for protecting the measurement data, which helps to solve problems in the verification of authenticity, integrity, measure ment accuracy and other reliability of the data. The signing of accuracy, integrity, reliabil ity and authenticity of data enables a broad data market to be formed, as the users of measuring devices may sell the signed data for use by other organizations. Such situations may encompass e.g. the selling of anonymized car outdoor temperature data and position information for the providers of weather services. According to studies, by the mere reuse of data and analytics within one company, an improvement of 3-7% in productivity may be achieved. When data may be reliably combined from many different sources and over company boundaries, at a general estimate on average a corresponding and in the best case a multiple improvement in productivity may be achieved .

Fig. 1 illustrates, by way of example, compo nents of a system 1000 according to the invention, in which system 1000 various embodiments of the present invention may be implemented. In the example of Fig. 1 there is illustrated a measuring device 200, in connec tion with which a data security module 100 according to the invention is arranged. In the example of Fig. 1 the measuring device 200 is in communication connection (by wireless and/or wired means) with a communications net work 300 (such as the Internet), and thereby with one or more third party apparatuses 400 which are also con nected to the communications network 300. Examples of the third party 400 include an elDAS (Electronic Iden tification, Authentication and Trust Services) pro vider, a real-time clock synchronization server, pro viders of measurement data related services, providers of data markets, other users of measuring devices etc. The arrangement illustrated in Fig. 1 enables the cer tification of a measurement result of the measuring de vice 200 and forwarding of the certified measurement result further for various applications, as will be ex plained in more detail below. The measuring device 200 illustrated in Fig. 1 corresponds to the measuring de vice 200A illustrated in Fig. 2B and to the measuring device 200B illustrated in Fig. 2C.

Fig. 2A is a block diagram of a data security module 100 according to the invention.

The data security module 100 described below may, for example, be implemented as a data security module which includes hardware and/or software and which may be provided as part of the measuring device 200A producing measurement results or connected between the measuring device 200B producing measurement results and the communications network 300. The data security module 100 may also be implemented as a software module pro vided as part of the software of the measuring device 200A producing measurement results such that it utilizes a hardware-level data security module existing in the measuring device 200A (not illustrated in Fig. 2B) , for example a so-called trusted execution environment which is integrated in a processor 202 of the measuring device 200A and which may be for example SGX from Intel or TrustZone from ARM. The data security module 100 may also be implemented as a software component without a hardware-level data security module, if the measuring device 200A in which the data security module 100 is incorporated is as a whole considered sufficiently se cure, for example because the hardware is fully sealed. This may be the situation for example if the measuring device 200A is itself able to detect the breakage of the seal and store information on the breakage of the seal such that the information may not be deleted.

An embodiment of the data security module 100 may be a dedicated, integrated and/or packaged micro- circuit which may be designed such that it is easily integratable as part of the measuring device 200A pro ducing measurement results. The microcircuit according to this embodiment may include one or more of the sub- components described below, implemented by way of hard ware. The microcircuit may be implemented by technology preventing the cryptographic keys and/or other infor mation stored thereon from being read and/or exposed (so-called tamper proof technology) .

In an embodiment, the various components of the data security module 100, such as a key storage 110, a signing function 120, a certificate storage 130, a PUF 140, a real-time clock 150 and/or a communication func tion 160 are configured to communicate with each other via or by means of a communication connection 170, such as a bus. In an embodiment, between the signing function 120 and the key storage 110 there is arranged a direct communication connection 180 separate from the communi cation connection 170. In an embodiment, between the PUF 140 and the key storage 110 there is arranged a direct communication connection 190 separate from the communi cation connection 170.

In an embodiment, the data security module 100 may also comprise a processor and/or a memory (not il lustrated in Fig. 2A) . This arrangement may be advanta geous for example in the example of Fig. 2C in which the data security module 100 is implemented as an external module with respect to the measuring device 200B.

The data security module 100 comprises a key storage 110 which is configured to store a cryptographic key in a protected manner, i.e. such that said crypto graphic key is usable internally in the data security module 100 without being accessible from outside of the data security module 100 (in other words, such that said cryptographic key cannot be for example read, copied or forwarded from/to outside of the data security module 100) . In an embodiment of the invention, this protection of the key storage 110 is implemented on a hardware level .

The data security module 100 further comprises a signing function 120 which is configured to perform digital signing using the cryptographic key stored in the key storage 110. In an embodiment of the invention, the signing function 120 is implemented at least partly on a hardware level. In an embodiment, the direct com munication connection 180 separate from the bus 170, arranged between the signing function 120 and the key storage 110, enables the signing function 120 to use a secret key 111 (for example read the contents of the secret key 111) . In this embodiment, the secret key 111 cannot be read via the communication connection 170.

The data security module 100 further comprises a certificate storage 130 which is configured to store at least a part of a digital calibration certificate (DCC) 131 associated with the measuring device 200A, 200B (described in more detail below in connection with Fig. 2B-2C) associated with the data security module 100 such that this at least part of the digital calibration certificate 131 is accessible from outside of the data security module 100 (in other words, such that this at least part of the digital calibration certificate 131 can be for example read, copied and/or forwarded from/to outside of the data security module 100) .

In an example the certificate storage 130 may require that when the certificate 131 is being updated, the new certificate version must be a newer version of the certificate which is already stored in the storage 130. This may be implemented for example such that the storage 130 requires that the new certificate includes a cryptographic or other hash of the old certificate, and that the new certificate is signed with at least a same key as the certificate stored in the storage 130.

The cryptographic key stored in the key storage 110 is the secret key 111 of a public key cryptography key pair of associated with the measuring device 200A, 200B, and the at least part of the digital calibration certificate 131 stored in the certificate storage 130 is associated with a public key 132 corresponding to the secret key 111. In an embodiment of the invention, the feature that the at least part of the digital calibra tion certificate 131 stored in the certificate storage

130 is associated with the public key 132 corresponding to the secret key 111 comprises that the at least part of the digital calibration certificate 131 stored in the certificate storage 130 comprises this public key 132. In another embodiment of the invention, the feature that the at least part of the digital calibration certificate

131 stored in the certificate storage 130 is associated with the public key 132 corresponding to the secret key 111 comprises that the at least part of the digital calibration certificate 131 stored in the certificate storage 130 comprises identity information associated with this public key 132. The public key 132 may be accessed by means of the identity information associated with the public key 132.

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module 100 further comprises a PUF (physical unclonable function or physically unclonable function) 140 for generating the secret key 111 during runtime. Thereby the secret key 111 may be produced in a secure manner (for example when the data security module 100 and/or the measuring device 200A starts up) without hav ing to permanently store the secret key 111 in the data security module 100. In an embodiment, the direct com munication connection 190 separate from the bus 170, which is arranged between the PUF 140 and the key storage 110, enables the PUF 140 to write the secret key 111 in the key storage 110. In this embodiment, the secret key 111 cannot be written via the communication connection 170. In another embodiment there is no communication connection 190, but data security is arranged such that the PUF 140 does not disclose the generated secret key 111 except once (for example when the secret key 111 is written in the key storage 110 after start-up) . In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module 100 further comprises a real-time clock 150. The real-time clock 150 may, for example, be used for attaching a timestamp to the measurement results, which timestamp may be part of the information which is certified by signing.

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module 100 further comprises a communication function 160 for external communication of the data se curity module. By means of the communication function 160 the data security module 100 may for example com municate with the outside world and for example verify that the real-time clock 150 of the data security module 100 runs in universal time. The communication function 160 may be protected from other software and hardware of the data security module 100 and/or the measuring device 200A such that the data security module 100 may verify that the communication is with an external ser vice, for example an Internet-based service, the iden tity and for example a cryptographic identifier of which may be stored in the data security module 100, for ex ample in the certificate storage 130 when this crypto graphic identifier is a public key or in the key storage 110 when this cryptographic identifier is a secret key.

In this text the term "storage" refers to a memory which is used for a specific purpose and to which functions have been linked. In an example, the key stor age 110 is thereby a memory which is located in the data security module 100 and to which it is possible to write (for changing a key) but which cannot be read. The reading of the memory 110 has been prevented at a hard ware level, for example such that there are no circuits needed for reading in the hardware. The signing function (for example a separate logic circuit) 120 is linked to the memory 110, to which signing function a processor using the data security module 100 (such as the proces sor 202 in the example of Fig. 2B or the external data security module's 100 own processor in the example of Fig. 2C) may input, i.e. write, a document to be signed (i.e. for example a combination of a measurement result and the digital calibration certificate 131 or a hash of the calibration certificate 131) and from which sign ing function it may after some time read the digital signature corresponding to the document in question.

Fig. 2B is a block diagram of a measuring de vice 200A according to the invention.

The measuring device 200A is arranged in con nection with the data security module 100. In the exam ple of Fig. 2B this means that the data security module 100 is integrated as a part of the measuring device 200A. The data security module 100 may, for example, be a microcircuit or another hardware-based implementa tion. Alternatively, the data security module 100 may be implemented as a part of the software of the measuring device 200A. Alternatively, the data security module 100 may be implemented as partly hardware and partly soft ware. In an example, the measuring device 200A comprises an IoT (Internet of Things) measuring device.

The measuring device 200A comprises a measuring instrument 201 (such as a sensor or the like), at least one processor 202, and at least one memory 204 which comprises computer program code 205.

Although the measuring device 200A of Fig. 2B is illustrated as comprising only one processor 202, the measuring device 200A may comprise a plurality of pro cessors. In an embodiment, the computer program code 205 may comprise instructions 205 (e.g. an operating system and/or various applications) . In addition, stored in structions may be executed by the processor 202. In an embodiment, the processor 202 may be embodied as a multi-core processor, a single-core processor, or a com bination of one or more multi-core processors and one or more single-core processors. The processor 202 may, for example, be embodied as one or more of various pro cessing devices, such as a coprocessor, a microproces sor, a controller, a DSP (digital signal processor) , a processing circuitry with or without a DSP, or various other processing devices including an ASIC (application specific integrated circuit), an FPGA circuit (field programmable gate array) , a microcontroller unit, a hardware accelerator, or the like. In an embodiment, the processor 202 may be configured to execute a hardcoded functionality. In an embodiment, the processor 202 is embodied as an executor of software instructions, wherein the processor 202 may be configured with the instructions to execute the algorithms and/or operations described in this disclosure when the instructions are executed .

The memory 204 may be embodied as one or more volatile memory devices, one or more non-volatile memory devices, and/or a combination of one or more volatile memory devices and one or more non-volatile memory de vices. The memory 204 may, for example, be embodied as a semiconductor memory such as, for example, a PROM (programmable ROM) , an EPROM (erasable PROM) , a flash ROM, a RAM (random access memory) etc.

In an embodiment, various components of the measuring device 200A, such as the measuring instrument 201, the processor 202, the memory 204, and/or the data security module 100 are configured to communicate with each other via or by means of a communication connection 203, such as a bus. The communication connection 203 may be arranged for example on a printed circuit board, such as a mother board or the like.

The measuring device 200A illustrated and de scribed herein is only an example of a device which may utilize the embodiments of the invention, and it is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the inven tion. It is to note that the measuring device 200A may comprise more or fewer components than what is illus trated in Fig. 2. The measuring device 200A may be dis tributed into several different physical entities com municating with each other by means of a suitable com munication connection.

The at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to take under processing a measurement result produced using the measuring instrument 201.

The at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to associate the digital calibration certificate 131 associated with the public key 132 corresponding to the secret key 111 stored in the key storage 110 of the data security module 100 with the measurement result taken under processing. In an example embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to perform this association of the digital calibration cer tificate 131 with the measurement result taken under processing by generating a hash of the digital calibra tion certificate 131 and by including the generated hash in the measurement result taken under processing. In an example embodiment, in addition to and/or instead of a hash of the digital calibration certificate 131, a suit able identifier of the calibration certificate 131 may be included in the measurement result taken under pro cessing .

A simplified example of presenting the meas urement result in an XML (extensible markup language) code is:

<measurement-result> ... </measurement-result> Then the same XML code for the measurement re sult is for example as follows when the calibration certificate is associated with it:

<measurement-resuit-with-associated-calibra tion-certificate>

<measurement-result> ... </measurement-result> <associated-calibration-certificate> <calibration-certificate-identifier> ...c/cal ibration-certi ficate-identi fier>

<calibration-certificate- finger

prints .. </calibration-certificate-fingerprint>

</associated-calibration-certificate>

</measurement-resuit-with-associated-calibra tion-certificate>

In this example an identifier and a digital hash of the calibration certificate are attached to / included in the measurement result.

The at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to digitally sign the associated measurement result using the signing function of the data security module lOOand the secret key 111 stored in the key storage 110.

Continuing the example presented above, the XML code for the measurement result is for example as fol lows after signing:

<signed-measurement-result>

<measurement-resuit-with-associated-calibra tion-certificate>

<measurement-result> ... </measurement-result> <associated-calibration-certificate> <calibration-certificate-identifier> ... /cal ibration-certificate-identifier> <calibration-certificate- finger prints .. </calibration-certificate-fingerprint>

</associated-calibration-certificate>

</measurement-result-with-associated-calibra tion-certificate>

<digital-signature> ... </digital-signature>

</signed-measurement-result>

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to generate a hash of the signed measurement result and store the generated hash in a blockchain. The blockchain used may be for example ethereum or hyperledger fabric. Storing the gen erated hash of the signed measurement result in a block- chain provides for example the advantage of indicating that the measurement result was at the latest created when storing in the blockchain was performed, because the blockchain cannot be changed afterwards. In other words, by using a blockchain a so-called notarized timestamp may be provided.

In an embodiment of the invention, the data security module 100 comprises a real-time clock 150 and the at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to generate a timestamp for the signed measurement result using the real-time clock 150. The timestamp produced using the real-time clock 150 may be used, for example, as an alternative for a timestamp produced using a blockchain .

In an embodiment of the invention, the at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to generate a timestamp for the signed measurement result using e!DAS (Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services) . elDAS is a regulation of the European Union (EU) on electronic trust services including e.g. an electronic timestamp which is a timestamp attached to an electronic signature and which certifies the time of signing, or at least the time before which the signing was performed, if timestamping is made afterwards.

By means of the data security module 100 the measuring device 200A, 200B containing or otherwise be ing linked to the module may be strongly identified, using for example the secret key 111 corresponding to the public key 132 stored in the certificate storage 130 or the secret key produced using the PUF 140 for the signing of suitable identification information. The identification information may be for example produced by the measuring device 200A or the data security module 100 or it may form part of an identification protocol in which the identification information or part of it is obtained from outside of the measuring device 200A by means of a communication connection.

By means of the data security module 100 the measurement results produced by the measuring device 200A, 200B may for example be signed in such a way that the user of the measurement results may, for example: a) check which measuring device has produced the re sults, b) at which time (date and time) the results have been produced and/or signed, c) that the results have not been changed after the measuring device 200A has signed them, d) what calibration certificate 131 has been stored in the measuring device 200A, 200B when the results were signed, e) what was or were the current measurement uncertainty or uncertainties on the basis of the calibration certificate 131 when the measurement was performed and/or signed. This type of signing to gether with the calibration certificate 131 may indicate which measuring device has produced the measurement re- suits, in which units the measurement result is pre sented, and what is the measurement accuracy of the result .

In an embodiment of the invention the at least one memory 204 and the computer program code 205 are further configured with the at least one processor 202 to cause the measuring device 200A to protect communi cation with an external third party. By means of the data security module 100 the measurement results may for example be protected from external observers, for exam ple by using a cryptographically protected connection between the data security module 100 and an external server and/or by using a cryptographic key which may be protected using the key storage 110 in a way that enables trusted third parties to access the measurement results but prevents the access of others to their content. This function may protect different parts of the measurement results, such as only numerical values, in addition to the numerical values also other information, or for ex ample all information of the measurement results in cluding the signatures. This function may be implemented using for example public or secret key cryptographic methods .

The data security module 100 may be provided such that it is directly integrated into a digital busi ness platform, which enables the connection of an IoT measuring device to an open network and the selling of data in a data market. This may mean, for example, that the measurements signed with the data security module 100 are protected such that they may only be utilized by a licensed party or parties and that at least the licensed parties may verify the authenticity of the sig nature .

An example of the digital business platform is a business platform, i.e. a marketplace by means of which the businesses providing measurement results may offer for utilization and third parties may utilize the generated measurement data and/or respective metadata, such as place and time, and for example information on the measurement calibration of the device, such as meas urement accuracy, measurement unit and the performer of the calibration.

An advantageous embodiment of the invention may include a data security module implemented as a micro- circuit, and a combination of so-called cloud services, one or more blockchains and one or more distributed databases. In this embodiment, the cloud services, block chain (s) and database or databases form a technical platform on which the above-mentioned digital business platform is implemented.

Such microcircuit implementation may be based on a so-called SoC (system on chip) technology in which on the same semiconductor chip several different hard ware functions are integrated to enable the storage and execution of software utilizing them, and/or a so-called SiP (system in package) technology in which in the same package there are several semiconductor chips coupled partly to each other and partly to the outside world.

The distributed database used or a plurality of such databases may be implemented with a so-called distributed ledger technology (DLT) . The DLT used may be for example Hyperledger Indy or Corda R3. The block- chain or DLT used may include a so-called smart contract function .

Combining the blockchains and databases imple mented with DLT in the system into a technical platform and/or to implement the digital business platform may be based on so-called interledger methods. The in terledger methods may be fully or partly based on so- called HTLA (hashed time lock agreement) protocols and/or algorithms. Such HTLA or other interledger method may be based on a component or function implemented with the above-described microcircuit. Such function may for example be reliable measurement of time (e.g. the real- time clock 150), an accelerator of a cryptographic func tion (e.g. the signing function 120) and/or a secure cryptographic key storage and use function (e.g. the key storage 110 and/or the certificate storage 130) .

One or some of the distributed databases or blockchains used may be integrated and partly (or fully) implemented with a microcircuit. Such microcircuit im plementation may be implemented partly (or fully) as a hardware, i.e. semiconductor implementation. Such hard ware implementation may include an accelerator suitable for implementing a so-called proof of work (PoW) or other corresponding (proof of stake, proof of elapsed time, etc.) method. The accelerator may be for example hardware implementation of the digital hash function. The hash function used may be for example SHA-256 or another digital hash function generally used in in terledger or distributed database implementations.

Fig. 2C is a block diagram of another measuring device 200B according to the invention. In the example of Fig. 2B, the feature that the measuring device 200B is arranged in connection with the data security module 100 means that the data security module 100 is imple mented as an external module with respect to the meas uring device 200B and connected to the measuring device 200B in such a way that the data security module 100 and the measuring device 200B are able to communicate with each other. In other features the measuring device 200B corresponds to the measuring device 200A of Fig. 2B and therefore the measuring instrument 201, the processor 202, the memory 204, the computer program code 205, their operation and interaction with the data security module 100 are not described again in this connection.

Fig. 3A presents an example flow diagram of a method 500A for certification of a measurement result of the measuring device 200A, 200B. Operation 501 comprises taking under pro cessing, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, a measure ment result produced using the measuring device 200A, 200B .

Operation 502 comprises associating, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, the digital calibration certificate 131 with the measurement result taken under processing, the digital calibration certificate associ ated with the public key 132 corresponding to the secret key 111 stored in the key storage 110 of the data secu rity module 100 arranged in connection with the measur ing device 200A, 200B.

Operation 503 comprises digitally signing, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, the associated meas urement result using the signing function 120 of the data security module 100 and the secret key 111 stored in the key storage 110.

Optional operation 504 comprises generating, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, a hash of the signed measurement result, and operation 505 comprises storing, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, the generated hash in a blockchain.

Optional operation 506A comprises generating, by the measuring device 200A, 200B, a timestamp for the signed measurement result using the real-time clock 150.

The method 500A may be performed by the meas uring devices 200A, 200B of Fig. 2B, 2C. The additional features of the method 500A result directly from the functions and parameters of the devices 200A, 200B, and are therefore not repeated here. The method 500A may be performed by one or more computer programs . The opera tions of the method 500A may be performed in an order differing from that presented in the example of Fig. 3A. For example, operation 506A of generating a timestamp may alternatively be performed for example before oper ation 503 of digital signing. Fig. 3B presents an example flow diagram of a method 500B for certification of a measurement result of the measuring device 200A, 200B.

The method 500B comprises optional operation 506B of generating, by the measuring device, a timestamp for the signed measurement result using elDAS (Elec tronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Ser vices) . In other features the method 500B corresponds to the method 500A of Fig. 3A and therefore operations 501-505 are not described again in this connection.

The method 500B may be performed by the meas uring devices 200A, 200B of Fig. 2B, 2C. The additional features of the method 500B result directly from the functions and parameters of the devices 200A, 200B, and are therefore not repeated here. The method 500B may be performed by one or more computer programs . The opera tions of the method 500B may be performed in an order differing from that presented in the example of Fig. 3B. For example, operation 506B of generating a timestamp may alternatively be performed for example before oper ation 503 of digital signing.

The example embodiments may include, for exam ple, any suitable measuring devices and equivalent de vices capable of performing the processes of the example embodiments. The devices and subsystems of the example embodiments may communicate with each other using any suitable protocol and may be implemented using one or more programmed measuring systems or devices.

One or more interface mechanisms may be used with the example embodiments, including for example In ternet connection, telecommunication in any suitable form (e.g. voice, modem, etc.), wireless communication media, and the like. The communication networks or con nections used may include for example one or more sat ellite communication networks, wireless communication networks, cellular communication networks, 3G communi- cation networks, 4G communication networks, 5G communi cation networks, public switched telephone network, packet data networks, Internet, intranet networks, a combination of some of them etc.

It is to be understood that the example embod iments are examples only, because many modifications of the specific hardware used for implementing the example embodiments are possible, as will be appreciated by per sons skilled in the art. For example, the functionality of one or more components of the example embodiments may be implemented by way of hardware and/or software.

The example embodiments may store information related to the different processes described in this disclosure. Such information may be stored in one or more memories such as, for example, a hard disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a RAM, etc. The information used for implementing the example embodi ments of the present invention may be stored in one or more databases. The databases may be organized using data structures (e.g. records, arrays, tables, fields, graphs, trees, lists, etc.) included in one or more of the memories or storage devices listed herein. The pro cesses described for the example embodiments may include the relevant data structures for storing the data col lected and/or generated by the processes of the devices and subsystems of the example embodiments in one or more databases .

The example embodiments may be implemented fully or partly using one or more general-purpose pro cessors, microprocessors, DSPs, microcontrollers, etc., which are programmed according to the teachings of the example embodiments of the present invention, as persons skilled in the art would understand. The average pro grammer may easily produce the relevant software on the basis of the teachings of the example embodiments, as persons skilled in the software arts would understand. In addition, the example embodiments may be implemented with application-specific integrated circuits or by com bining a relevant network of traditional component cir cuits, as is understood by persons skilled in the elec tronic arts. Thus, the example embodiments are not lim ited to any specific combination of hardware and/or software .

Stored on any computer-readable medium or their combination, the example embodiments of the present in vention may comprise software for controlling the com ponents of the example embodiments, running the compo nents of the example embodiments, enabling interaction of the components of the example embodiments with a human user etc. This type of software may include, but is not limited to, device drivers, firmware, operating systems, software development tools, application soft ware, etc. The computer-readable media may further in clude the computer program product according to an em bodiment of the present invention for executing the pro cesses to be performed to implement the invention fully or partly (if the processing is distributed) . The com puter code devices of the example embodiments of the present invention may include any suitable interpretable or executable code mechanisms, including but not limited to scripts, interpretable programs, dynamic link li braries, Java classes and applets, fully executable pro grams etc. In addition, parts of the processing of the example embodiments of the present invention may be dis tributed to improve performance, reliability, costs etc.

As stated above, the components of the example embodiments may include a computer-readable medium or memory for storing the instructions programmed according to the teachings of the present invention and for stor ing the data structures, arrays, records and/or other data described in this disclosure. The computer-readable medium may comprise any suitable medium which partici pates in arranging instructions for being executed by a processor. This type of medium may take many different forms, including but not limited to a non-volatile or non-transitory storage medium, a volatile or transitory storage medium, etc. A non-volatile storage medium may comprise for example optical or magnetic disks, etc. A volatile storage medium may comprise for example dynamic memories etc. General forms of the computer-readable medium may include for example a floppy disk, a hard disk or any other suitable medium from which a computer may read.

The invention is not limited only to the above- described examples of its embodiments; instead, many modifications are possible within the scope of the in ventive idea defined by the claims.